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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 2016 U.S. elections, online disinformation has joined hate speech, 
terrorist incitement, and other forms of “harmful online content” as a key target for 
corporate and government policy makers.1 Most major content platforms have 
developed policies and other approaches for disinformation, while legislative and 
regulatory proposals specifically designed to address online disinformation have 
been enacted in consolidated democracies, like France, unconsolidated democracies, 
like Malaysia, and autocratic states, like Singapore.2 Meanwhile, several other 
jurisdictions have begun considering proposals to address disinformation, together 
with other content issues, through a single, comprehensive regulatory framework.3 
These laws and other similar proposals have sparked considerable debate, with 
critics focusing primarily on the effects—whether intended or not—that such 
measures could have on freedom of opinion and expression.4  
                                               
* © 2020 Jason Pielemeier. Policy Director at the Global Network Initiative (GNI). This 
Essay is written in his personal capacity and does not represent the views of the GNI or any 
of its members. 
1 See infra Part IV. 
2 See infra Sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2 (discussing the E.U. and France’s laws regarding 
disinformation and the manipulation of information). 
3 The Government of the United Kingdom released a comprehensive proposal to 
address “online harms” by empowering a regulatory authority to develop issue-specific 
“codes” and enforcing a broad “duty of care” on a large swath of digital service providers. 
See generally SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEPARTMENT OF DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA & 
SPORT & SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, ONLINE HARMS WHITE PAPER, 
2019, CP 57, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ 
attachment_data/file/793360/Online_Harms_White_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/BHR8-
DAU5] (releasing the United Kingdom’s proposal for addressing online harms). The Irish 
government has proposed a similar approach in its “Online Safety and Media Regulation Bill 
2019.” See General Scheme Online Safety Media Regulation Bill 2019, GOV’T OF IR., DEP’T 
OF COMM., CLIMATE ACTION, & ENV’T, https://www.dccae.gov.ie/en-ie/communications/ 
legislation/Pages/General-Scheme-Online-Safety-Media-Regulation.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
E2PC-2TB5] (last visited May 26, 2020). Most recently, the new President of the European 
Commission has announced plans to develop a comprehensive, European Union-wide 
“Digital Services Act.” See Kenneth Propp, The Emerging EU Regulatory Landscape for 
Digital Platform Liability, ATL. COUNCIL (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ 
blogs/new-atlanticist/the-emerging-eu-regulatory-landscape-for-digital-platform-liability/ 
[https://perma.cc/K42E-9KBZ]. 
4 See, e.g., U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Op. and Expression, Org. for Sec. 
& Co-operation in Eur. Representative on Freedom of the Media, Org. of Am. States Special 
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This Essay articulates some of the critical ways in which disinformation differs 
from other categories of harmful content and explores some of the early efforts by 
platforms and governments to address the issue. It begins by analyzing the semantics 
around disinformation, explaining how specific terminology can allude to distinct 
concerns. It then explores the similarities and differences between disinformation 
and related categories of harmful content, like hate speech and terrorist incitement, 
before examining some of the corporate and regulatory initiatives that have emerged. 
It concludes with some observations and cautionary notes for corporate and 
governmental policy makers as they consider how best to address disinformation.  
 
II.  DEFINING DISINFORMATION 
 
There are a variety of terms used to describe the ways information is (mis)used 
to shape people’s beliefs and behavior.5 “Disinformation” has emerged as the most 
popular term used by government regulators to broadly describe the kinds of online-
specific manipulation that they are most concerned about. Although there is a 
plethora of definitions of “disinformation,” in this Essay, I will use the European 
Commission’s definition from the “Communication on tackling online 
disinformation” and “Action Plan Against Disinformation.”6   
                                               
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, & African Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Info., Joint Declaration on 
Freedom of Expression and “Fake News,” Disinformation and Propaganda, U.N. Doc. 
FOM.GAL/3/17, at 1 (March 3, 2017), https://www.osce.org/fom/302796?download=true 
[https://perma.cc/ML3K-Z9K6] [hereinafter Joint Declaration] (“Stressing that the human 
right to impart information and ideas is not limited to ‘correct’ statements, that the right also 
protects information and ideas that may shock, offend and disturb.”) (emphasis in original). 
5 For a helpful primer on these different terms, see generally Dean Jackson, Issue Brief: 
Distinguishing Disinformation from Propaganda, Misinformation, and “Fake News,” 
NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.ned.org/issue-brief-
distinguishing-disinformation-from-propaganda-misinformation-and-fake-news/ [https://pe 
rma.cc/8BXU-F52H] (defining the term disinformation and explaining why the current 
information environment amplifies disinformation). See also CAROLINE JACK, DATA & 
SOCIETY, LEXICON OF LIES: TERMS FOR PROBLEMATIC INFORMATION 2–8, 11–12 (Aug. 9, 
2017), https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_LexiconofLies.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/87YY-LWY3] (explaining the differences between the terms propaganda, disinformation, 
and misinformation); Claire Wardle & Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward 
an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy Making, COUNCIL OF EUR. 4, 20–
42 (Sept. 27, 2017), https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-report-version-august-
2018/16808c9c77 [https://perma.cc/YJ48-RSLE] (examining “information disorder” and 
defining terms to “capture the complexity of the phenomenon”). 
6 See generally Commission Communication for Tackling Online Disinformation: A 
European Approach, COM (2018) 236 final (Apr. 26, 2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236&from=EN [https://perma.cc/7BJW-
5ZTS] [hereinafter Tackling Online Disinformation] (discussing the EU’s approach to 
 
2020] DISENTANGLING DISINFORMATION 919 
As I explain later in this Essay,7 that definition is a variation on an earlier one 
developed by a High Level Expert Group (“HLEG”) convened by the Commission 
to advise on policy initiatives concerning those topics, and thus has a degree of 
multi-stakeholder validation and purchase that many other definitions lack.8 The 
Commission’s definition is also quite broad and is therefore likely to include most, 
if not all, of the kinds of content that lawmakers in different contexts are concerned 
about (for instance, some governments are focused primarily on foreign propaganda, 
while others are more concerned about economically motivated disinformation, and 
the EU’s definition covers both). For that same reason, it may also include some 
categories of information that are difficult to distinguish from speech that is 
traditionally considered protected. As I discuss below, that critique helps illustrate 
one of the important ways in which efforts to address disinformation through 
regulation may need to differ from attempts to address other forms of online content.  
The Commission defines disinformation as “verifiably false or misleading 
information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to 
intentionally deceive the public, and may cause public harm.”9 As the table below 
illustrates, this definition covers deliberately spreading false news (often referred to 
as “fake news”), marketing products using false information, and distributing altered 
content (modified records, deep fakes, deceptively edited content or “shallow 
fakes,” etc.).10 In some contexts, it may also include “blended” information (with 
elements of true and false content) and true information that is propagated with the 
intent to deceive the public, which is sometimes described as “propaganda” or “mal-
information.”  
However, the Commission was deliberately ambiguous about its relationship to 
categories of content that are already illegal (defamation, hate speech, etc.) and made 
it clear that the definition does not include objectively false information that is 
spread by those who believe it to be true (or are uncertain about its veracity), which 
is often referred to as “misinformation,” nor “reporting errors, satire and parody, 
                                               
tackling online disinformation); EUR. COMM’N, EU CODE OF PRACTICE ON DISINFORMATION 
(2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54454 [https://perma.cc/ 
W3T2-ZRKF] [hereinafter EU CODE OF PRACTICE] (outlining the EU’s code for regulating 
disinformation). 
7 See infra Section IV.B.1. 
8 See generally Indep. High Level Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation, A 
Multi-Dimensional Approach to Disinformation (March 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/news 
room/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=50271 [https://perma.cc/D7ZP-3R3D] [hereinafter High 
Level Group Report] (reporting to the European Commission that, given the complexity of 
the disinformation issue, a multi-shareholder solution is required). 
9 Tackling Online Disinformation, supra note 6, at § 2.1. 
10 For more on the distinction between deep fakes, shallow fakes, and other forms of 
media manipulation, see Deepfakes, Shallowfakes and Speech Synthesis: Tackling 
Audiovisual Manipulation, Eur. Parliamentary Research Serv. (Dec. 4, 2019), 
https://sciencemediahub.eu/2019/12/04/deepfakes-shallowfakes-and-speech-synthesis-tack 
ling-audiovisual-manipulation/ [https://perma.cc/KC5W-XFA6].  
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[and] clearly identified partisan news and commentary.”11 It also arguably excludes 
opinion or true information that is propagated with the intent to distract or influence, 
which is sometimes described as “strategic communication.”12 Other categories of 
content that appear not to be included under this definition include: doxxing 
(disseminating identifying or private information about an individual or 
organization), marketing, and predictions. 
Some companies, researchers, and advocates have focused less on what 
constitutes disinformation and more on how inauthentic information is spread.13 This 
is in part because it can be easier to determine when certain methods and technical 
tools of dissemination, including bots, paid amplification, and/or coordinated 
campaigns, are used than it is to evaluate the veracity of the underlying content.14 
This approach tends to prioritize the scale of the campaign over the potential harm 
of the information being shared. 
 
Dissecting the EU’s Definition of Disinformation 
 








 . . . for 
economic 
gain 
 . . . may cause public 
harm. 
For-profit, anti-vax campaigns; 
Click-bait targeted along racial, 
ideological, or other politically-
motivated themes 
 . . . does not cause 
public harm. 
Spurious click-bait 




 . . . may cause public 
harm. 
False news or deep fakes 
generated to spur hatred, 
division, political goals, etc. 
 . . . does not cause 
public harm. 







 . . . for 
economic 
gain 
 . . . may cause public 
harm. 
General or targeted marketing, 
search-engine optimization, or 
promotion of products that can 
cause public harm (e.g., 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals). 
 . . . does not cause 
public harm. 
General or targeted marketing, 
search-engine optimization, or 
                                               
11 EU CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 6, at Preamble.  
12 See generally Kirk Hallahan et al., Defining Strategic Communication, 1:1 INT’L J. 
STRATEGIC COMM. 3 (Mar. 2007) (examining the nature of strategic communication through 
six relevant disciplines). 
13 See infra Section IV.A.3. 
14 See Camille François, Actors, Behaviors, Content: A Disinformation ABC: 
Highlighting Three Vectors of Viral Deception to Guide Industry & Regulatory Responses 
2–6 (Sept. 20, 2019) (working paper) (on file with the Transatlantic High Level Working 
Group on Content Moderation Online and Freedom of Expression), 
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/ABC_Framework_2019_Sept_2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ECH4-BVAD].  
2020] DISENTANGLING DISINFORMATION 921 
promotion of natural 
supplements/ remedies, 
consumer goods, etc.; 
“reporting errors” 




 . . . may cause public 
harm. 
Shallow fakes; opinion/true 
information targeted at 
particular groups to spur hatred, 
division, political goals, etc. 
 . . . does not cause 
public harm. 
Shallow fakes or opinion with 
minimal impact 
Other excluded content Illegal content that is 
not false or 
misleading 
Hate speech, defamation, 
incitement to violence, revenge-
porn, etc. 
“Clearly identified 
partisan news and 
commentary” 
Campaign ads and other 
political content 
True information, 
even if shared with 
malicious intent 
Doxxing; unaltered intimate 
images; unaltered hacked 
materials (if not misleading)  
 
III.  WHAT MAKES DISINFORMATION DIFFERENT? 
 
Disinformation shares certain key characteristics with other categories of 
harmful content, such as terrorist incitement and hate speech. All of these categories 
are notoriously difficult to define in ways that are consistent with freedom of 
expression, and all of them are difficult to apply in instances where context is limited 
or difficult to objectively discern. In addition, they each tend to produce diffuse 
social impacts, rather than narrow personal harms, thereby minimizing the extent to 
which states or platforms can rely on “victims” to assist in identifying and enforcing 
relevant rules. Finally, in the online context, the quantity of content that arguably 
falls into these categories is staggering, and its sources may be 
anonymous/pseudonymous and dispersed (including across platforms and borders), 
making it difficult, if not impossible, for any one nation-state or platform to 
effectively address it in isolation.  
These similarities, taken together, may explain the impulse on the part of some 
states to attempt to regulate the identification and enforcement of these categories 
under a single, comprehensive, regulatory framework. Notwithstanding these 
commonalities, disinformation has three distinguishing characteristics that make it 
uniquely difficult for nation-states and platforms to effectively address, especially 
under a single, catch-all approach. 
 
A.  Broader Spill-Over Effects (the “Definition Challenge”) 
 
First, while all categories of harmful content—including disinformation, 
terrorist incitement, and hate speech—are challenging to define, disinformation is 
especially difficult to prohibit without causing potentially broad impacts on lawful 
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and protected speech. Although it can be difficult to draw the line between speech 
that is hateful but lawful and hate speech, or content that celebrates terrorist causes 
and that which incites terrorist acts, many countries have nevertheless drawn these 
lines in ways that survive scrutiny under domestic and international human rights 
law—that is to say, in clear, narrow terms that are justified, necessary, and 
proportionate.15 By comparison, it can be extremely difficult to objectively 
determine the truth in a given context, much less establish whether an individual 
knew or should have known that certain information was untrue or misleading. This 
is a challenge that also arises in the application of reputation protection (i.e., 
defamation) laws, where truth is often considered an affirmative defense against 
liability.  
Another way to frame this is to say that the quantity of information that could 
be reasonably mistaken for hate speech or terrorist incitement is substantially 
smaller than that which could be confused for disinformation. For similar reasons, 
the potential for authorities to willingly misapply prohibitions on disinformation to 
censor and punish protected speech is arguably greater than it is vis-à-vis hate speech 
or terrorist incitement (although those categories have both been famously abused 
in the past16). 
Finally, even where disinformation laws are carefully drafted and applied, their 
potential chilling effects (i.e., likelihood of causing preemptive self-censorship) can 
nevertheless be significant since they could cause individuals to refrain from sharing 
content (as well as opinions) they perceive as objective or newsworthy but cannot 
independently or reliably verify. Since the public interest value of information that 
might be mistaken for disinformation (e.g., political opinion or independent 
journalism) can be much higher than legal but hateful content or terrorist 
propaganda, the ramification of such chilling effects in the context of disinformation 
are arguably much greater. 
 
B.  The Challenges of Proving Intent (the “Intent Challenge”) 
 
Second, unlike many prohibitions on hate speech and terrorist incitement, 
proving disinformation generally requires establishing intent on the part of the 
                                               
15 See, e.g., Joint Declaration, supra note 4, at 2–3. Indeed, while it is relatively easy to 
identify which of the enumerated “legitimate purposes” justify prohibitions on hate speech 
and terrorist incitement, it is much harder to articulate which purpose or combination of 
purposes are served by prohibiting disinformation. 
16 See, e.g., LEWIS GORDON ET AL., OAKLAND INST., ETHIOPIA’S ANTI-TERRORISM 
LAW: A TOOL TO STIFLE DISSENT 9–11 (2015), https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oak 
landinstitute.org/files/OI_Ethiopia_Legal_Brief_final_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9FB-
CSZE]; The Global Gag on Free Speech Is Tightening: In Both Democracies and 
Dictatorships, It Is Getting Harder to Speak Up, ECONOMIST (Aug. 17, 2019), 
https://www.economist.com/international/2019/08/17/the-global-gag-on-free-speech-is-
tightening [https://perma.cc/R8FV-Q72D] (describing how hate speech and other laws are 
misused for censorship). 
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speaker.17 Determining a speaker’s intent is notoriously difficult18 and can be doubly 
difficult in online contexts where nuance, jargon, and slang—not to mention the use 
of different languages—proliferate.   
This challenge is compounded by the fact that disinformation, by definition, 
often must also have the potential to cause “public harm.”19 This implication of 
seriousness and scale suggests that, in many instances, a large number of individuals 
have spread the disinformation, despite the fact that they may not share the same 
intent to deceive. In other words, even if the intent of the author can be established, 
it may still be near impossible to prove the intent of others who have subsequently 
shared her disinformation. For this reason, some efforts to address disinformation 
have emphasized “traceability”—the ability to identify where information originated 
and has since spread—in a manner that laws addressing hate speech and terrorist 
incitement have not.20 This Essay explores the privacy implications of such 
requirements further below. 
Notably, the Commission’s definition bifurcates “economic gain” and “intent 
to deceive,” which could be read to prohibit disinformation spread with a 
remunerative goal, even where there is no demonstrated intent to deceive, or even 
awareness that the underlying information is misleading or inaccurate. While this 
broad approach could ease enforcement efforts to some degree, it could also increase 
the potential for over-enforcement and the chilling of certain economic activity.21  
 
C.  Diffuse and Lasting Impacts (the “Harm Challenge”) 
 
Third, whereas the very purpose of hate speech and terrorist incitement is to 
target specific individuals or groups by instilling fear and/or motivating actual harm, 
the purpose of any given piece of disinformation may be less clear and its impacts 
more diffuse. This is especially true of individual instances of disinformation that 
cannot be conclusively tied to broader campaigns. This makes it difficult to 
                                               
17 See High Level Group Report, supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing 
European Commission’s definition of disinformation). 
18 See generally Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1633 (2013) (discussing how a speaker’s intent is difficult to determine and 
how the chilling effect may not be a justification for speaker’s intent requirements). 
19 High Level Group Report, supra note 8, at 5.  
20 See infra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining Singapore’s implicit 
requirement that internet intermediaries employ methods to trace user activity). The Indian 
government has also proposed a set of draft rules that would require traceability. See Ministry 
of Electronics & Info. Tech., The Information Technology [Intermediaries Guidelines 
(Amendment) Rules] 3(5) (Dec. 24, 2018) (India), https://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/ 
Draft_Intermediary_Amendment_24122018.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6TL-S3PX] (requiring 
that intermediaries “shall enable tracing out of such originator of information on its platform 
as may be required by government agencies who are legally authorised”). 
21 For instance, journalistic publication is often done for a variety of reasons, including 
economic gain.  
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objectively establish and measure harm, thereby making it difficult to enforce 
prohibitions where evidence of large-scale, coordinated propagation is lacking.22 In 
addition, where individuals or entities are targeted for enforcement, they will often 
be able to justifiably complain about selective enforcement.    
To the extent that large-scale disinformation efforts may rely on a combination 
of inauthentic and/or boosted dissemination, as well as organic and uncoordinated 
amplification, it will also be difficult to identify precisely how much blame to 
attribute to the former versus the latter. Likewise, when disinformation campaigns 
exploit existing social divisions or lack of public awareness,23 it may be challenging 
to isolate and measure their “public harm.” As a result, the impacts and echoes of 
disinformation may linger long after particular content is identified and removed. 
Because it can take longer to identify disinformation, the perceived need to 
“remedy” the harm it creates and “correct the record” can drive an understandable 
impulse to track disinformation, not only horizontally (as it spreads to new users in 
real time) and prospectively (through filtering), but also retroactively. Horizontal 
and prospective tracking can be accomplished using metadata, data “hashes,” and 
even random “spot checks.”24 However, since it is impossible to know ex ante who 
will propagate disinformation, retrospective tracking requires the development of 
capabilities that would presumably impact all users and could result in de facto 
prohibitions on the use of encryption.25 Even if these capabilities are used narrowly 
in specific, pre-defined, and carefully overseen circumstances to address 
disinformation, they would create a universe of possibility that would be very hard 
for law enforcement to ignore and would almost certainly generate chilling effects.26 
In sum, all the elements that are traditionally necessary to prove a violation of 
criminal law—actus reas, mens rea, and damages—are more difficult to establish 
                                               
22 See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
23 See, e.g., Adam Entous et al., Russian Operatives Used Facebook Ads to Exploit 
America’s Racial and Religious Divisions, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2017, 03:15 PM MDT), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/russian-operatives-used-facebook-
ads-to-exploit-divisions-over-black-political-activism-and-muslims/2017/09/25/4a011242-
a21b-11e7-ade1-76d061d56efa_story.html [https://perma.cc/U8MA-N2WT] (pointing out 
that disinformation campaigns attributed to the Russian government have sought to 
exacerbate racial and religious divisions in the U.S.).  
24 For recent analyses of efforts along these lines, see Amelia Acker, Tracking 
Disinformation by Reading Metadata, MEDIUM (July 17, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@MediaManipulation/tracking-disinformation-by-reading-metadata-
320ece1ae79b [https://perma.cc/V5SX-LZHX] and GLOBAL DISINFORMATION INDEX, 
https://disinformationindex.org/the-index/ [https://perma.cc/J8KZ-S6DQ] (last visited Apr. 
8, 2020).  
25 See Jennifer Daskal, This ‘Fake News’ Law Threatens Free Speech. But it Doesn’t 
Stop There.: Singapore’s New Legislation Could Force Companies to Tell the Government 
What Websites Users Have Viewed., N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2019/05/30/opinion/hate-speech-law-singapore.html [https://perma.cc/7TAP-BAWX] 
(discussing the difficulties of enforcing a disinformation law). 
26 See id. 
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vis-à-vis disinformation than they are in the context of hate speech, terrorist 
incitement, or most other categories of harmful content. As a result, it is not 
surprising that efforts to-date to address disinformation have differed in important 
ways. 
 
IV.  HOW ARE COMPANIES AND GOVERNMENTS ADDRESSING DISINFORMATION? 
 
Efforts by governments and platforms to address hate speech and terrorist 
incitement have focused primarily on detecting and removing offending content as 
quickly as possible. However, because of how difficult it can be to define and apply 
prohibitions on disinformation, as well as legitimate concerns about platforms 
becoming arbiters of truth,27 governments and platforms have tended to propose 
solutions short of censorship. This Part provides an overview of company and 
government efforts to address disinformation. As this overview makes clear, there 
is a strong interplay between these actors, with governments pushing companies to 
take voluntary actions while threatening to provide greater oversight and 
accountability through regulation if necessary. 
 
A.  Company Efforts 
 
Large content platforms have taken a variety of steps to address disinformation 
and these efforts have been influenced by a wide range of both regulatory and non-
regulatory factors. In general, company efforts can be grouped into five categories: 
(1) limiting the reach of false news/information; (2) demonetization; (3) addressing 
inauthentic behavior; (4) contextualization; and (5) transparency. These efforts often 
allow the offending content to remain visible, albeit sometimes to a smaller audience 
and/or with signals or context that can help users understand the contested nature of 
the information being presented.  
It should be noted that, while almost all platforms have refused to prohibit fake 
news or disinformation as such,28 as the Venn diagram below illustrates, 
disinformation often contains elements of hate speech or extremist content that can 
                                               
27 See Tony Romm, Zuckerberg: Standing for Voice and Free Expression, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 17, 2019, 02:22 PM MDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/17/ 
zuckerberg-standing-voice-free-expression/ [https://perma.cc/T8FF-2C2E] (transcribing 
Mark Zuckerberg’s speech, “Standing for Voice and Free Expression: Speech Delivered at 
Georgetown University”).  
28 See John Oates, So How Well Did You Block Fake News, Google? Facebook? Web 
Goliaths Turn in Self-Assessment Homework to Europe: Unsurprisingly, Commish Thought 
That, in Fact, They Could Do Better, REGISTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 11:19), 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/10/30/eu_first_reports_on_disinformation_from_googl
e_twitter_and_facebook/ [https://perma.cc/K3QS-HKJAPERMA] (discussing Facebook and 
Google’s internal policies regarding the removal of disinformation).  
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be and often are otherwise targeted for removal.29 In addition, it is important to 
recognize that smaller platforms often lack the resources required to implement 
many of the systemic and nuanced policies set out below. As a result, some may 
have to rely more on users/community moderators (as in the case of Reddit30) or 
choose a more black-and-white approach (as Pinterest has done31). 
 




                                               
29 Disinformation can also incite violence in ways that would violate platform rules. 
See, e.g., Facebook Community Standards: 1. Violence and Incitement, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/credible_violence [https://perma.cc/4VFT 
-Z6YJ] (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (“While we understand that people commonly express 
disdain or disagreement by threatening or calling for violence in non-serious ways, we 
remove language that incites or facilitates serious violence.”).  
30 See, e.g., Managing Misinformation on Reddit, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 8, 2019, 
8:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/08/786039738/managing-misinformation-on-
reddit [https://perma.cc/M52N-EGTA] (explaining how Reddit relies on volunteer 
moderators). 
31 Community Guidelines, PINTEREST, https://policy.pinterest.com/en/community-
guidelines [https://perma.cc/6NEK-QB2H] (last visited Apr. 10, 2020) (setting out a policy 
that prohibits “[c]ontent that originates from disinformation campaigns”). 
Disinformation
Hate SpeechExtremist Content
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1.  Limiting Reach 
 
Major platforms have focused on improving the speed and accuracy with which 
they can identify disinformation peddled on their platforms by, for instance, 
improving machine learning detection tools and building better ways to work with 
users and third parties to identify and prevent it from spreading on their platforms.32 
Once disinformation is identified, platforms can limit its spread by, among other 
things, altering its ranking in algorithmic feeds in order to reduce its prevalence.33 
In addition to demoting false information, platforms have also taken steps to promote 
verified, authentic information and reporting, especially in the context of breaking 
news.34 This practice can have a similar and complementary effect as demotion by 
effectively making disinformation harder to access. 
 
2.  Demonetization 
 
Platforms have also attempted to limit the extent to which purveyors of 
disinformation can use tools designed for advertising and marketing (e.g., 
purchasing and targeting ads, “boosting” content) to augment their reach.35 For 
instance, Facebook has said that it is “[m]aking it as difficult as possible for people 
                                               
32 See Donald Hicks & David Gasca, A Healthier Twitter: Progress and More to Do, 
TWITTER: BLOG (Apr. 16, 2019), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/health 
-update.html [https://perma.cc/6SBG-C5KB] (heralding the use of technology to track spam, 
platform manipulation, and other rule violations); Adam Mosseri, Working to Stop 
Misinformation and False News, FACEBOOK FOR MEDIA (Apr. 7, 2017), 
https://www.facebook.com/facebookmedia/blog/working-to-stop-misinformation-and-false 
-news [https://perma.cc/R43T-NYAD] (stating Facebook is applying machine learning to 
assist response teams); Charlie Warzel, Why Can Everyone Spot Fake News But YouTube, 
Facebook, and Google?, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 22, 2018, 7:40 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/charliewarzel/why-can-everyone-spot-fake-news-
but-the-tech-companies [https://perma.cc/QCK3-FU8R] (citing YouTube stating that “it 
uses machine learning to flag possibly violative content for human review”).  
33 See Mosseri, supra note 32; Continuing Our Work to Improve Recommendations on 
YouTube, YOUTUBE: OFFICIAL BLOG (Jan. 25, 2019), https://youtube.googleblog.com/2019 
/01/continuing-our-work-to-improve.html [https://perma.cc/QXB9-W3CG] (promising to 
“tak[e] a closer look at how we can reduce the spread of content that comes close to—but 
doesn’t quite cross the line of—violating our Community Guidelines”). 
34 See, e.g., Breaking New and Top News on YouTube, YOUTUBE: HELP, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/9057101?hl=en [https://perma.cc/LT7R-
NNCU] (last visited Apr. 10, 2020) (showing YouTube’s “Breaking News” feature as an 
example of a platform which has taken steps to promote authentic information).  
35 For a summary of the ways that disinformation campaigns (ab)use the features 
inherent to digital, advertising-driven business models, see DIPAYAN GHOSH & BEN SCOTT, 
NEW AMERICA, #DIGITALDECEIT: THE TECHNOLOGIES BEHIND PRECISION PROPAGANDA 
ON THE INTERNET, (Jan. 2018), https://www.newamerica.org/documents/2077/digital-deceit-
final-v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2MH-PJBC].  
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posting false news to buy ads on our platform through strict enforcement of our 
policies,”36 while Google has enhanced its efforts to address misinformation placed 
in Google Ads, as well as through its “AdSense” service that helps publishers fund 
their own content by placing ads on their websites.37 For its part, Twitter has 
developed an “unacceptable business practices” ads policy, which prohibits 
advertising for accounts making misleading, false or unsubstantiated claims,38 as 
well as a “quality policy,” through which ads are reviewed to ensure they adhere to 
editorial guidelines.39 
 
3.  Addressing Inauthentic Behavior 
 
In recent months, platforms have also increased attention to the ways that fake 
accounts, spam, and “inauthentic” behavior are used as part of disinformation 
campaigns. This includes technical measures to detect the use of bots to create or 
coordinate accounts, as well as efforts to artificially “optimize” engagement or 
otherwise manipulate algorithmic feeds, including news feeds and search engine 
results.40 For instance, Twitter’s new “Platform Manipulation and Spam Policy” 
prohibits a range of behaviors, including: commercially-motivated spam; 
inauthentic engagements “that attempt to make accounts or content appear more 
popular or active than they are;” and coordinated activity “that attempts to artificially 
influence conversations through the use of multiple accounts, fake accounts, 
automation and/or scripting.”41 Given Facebook’s somewhat unique “real name” 
policy,42 which essentially prohibits pseudonymous accounts, it has been able to 
more specifically define and enforce “inauthentic behavior.”43 
                                               
36 Mosseri, supra note 32.  
37 See GOOGLE, EC EU CODE OF PRACTICE ON DISINFORMATION: GOOGLE ANNUAL 
REPORT 5–7 (Oct. 29, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=62 
680 [https://perma.cc/HJR4-VCA4] [hereinafter, GOOGLE DISINFORMATION REPORT]. 
38 See Unacceptable Business Practices, TWITTER: BUSINESSES, 
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/prohibited-content-policies/unacceptable-
business-practices.html [https://perma.cc/YES2-TUGV] (last visited Apr. 10, 2020) (stating 
Twitter’s ad policies for business practices).  
39 Quality Policy, TWITTER: BUSINESSES, https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-
policies/prohibited-content-policies/Quality_Policy.html [https://perma.cc/5XZE-MPR4] 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2020) (stating Twitter’s quality policy regarding ads).  
40 This is what Google refers to as “Engagement Abuse.” See GOOGLE 
DISINFORMATION REPORT, supra note 37, at 16.  
41 Platform Manipulation and Spam Policy, TWITTER: HELP CTR. (Sept. 2019), 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/platform-manipulation [https://perma.cc/3R 
23-6UQS].  
42 See What Names Are Allowed on Facebook?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/112146705538576 [https://perma.cc/4M3T-US7E] (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2020) (stating the names users cannot use and other things to keep in mind).  
43 Facebook defines “inauthentic behavior” as the: 
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4.  Contextualization 
 
Recognizing that disinformation will continue to exist on these platforms, 
notwithstanding efforts to limit its spread, platforms have also been providing 
additional resources to users in an attempt to limit the pernicious impacts of 
disinformation they may encounter. These efforts include providing additional 
context around content that may constitute disinformation, fact checking, and media 
literacy campaigns. For example, Facebook says it has been “exploring ways to give 
people more context about stories so they can make more informed decisions about 
what to read, trust, and share and ways to give people access to more perspectives 
about the topics that they’re reading.”44 This includes partnering with local NGOs 
to provide digital skills training and education,45 working with newsrooms and 
journalists,46 and collaborative efforts with researchers working on disinformation, 
including providing access to Facebook data and funding research.47 Meanwhile, 
Google has developed tools like the “Share the Facts” widget to facilitate fact 
checking and partnered with media to develop signals of trustworthiness, as well as 
content and source credibility.48 Smaller platforms have also engaged in user literacy 
efforts. For instance, the social media platform Tumblr recently rolled out six 
                                               
[U]se of Facebook or Instagram assets (accounts, pages, groups, or events), to 
mislead people or Facebook: about the identity, purpose or origin of the entity that 
they represent; about the popularity of . . . content or assets; about the purpose of 
an audience or community; about the source or origin of content; [or] to evade 
enforcement under . . . Community Standards.  
 
Facebook Community Standards: 20. Inauthentic Behavior, FACEBOOK, https://www.face 
book.com/communitystandards/inauthentic_behavior [https://perma.cc/5Z85-R54K] (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2020). “Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior” is defined as “the use of multiple 
. . . assets, working in concert to engage in Inauthentic Behavior,” including on behalf of a 
government actor. Id.  
44 Mosseri, supra note 32.  
45 See Digital Literacy Library, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/safety/educat
ors [https://perma.cc/G3NQ-E9S6] (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).  
46 See Welcome to the Facebook Journalism Project, FACEBOOK: JOURNALISM 
PROJECT, https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject [https://perma.cc/RB3N-W4G6] 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2020); Introducing the News Integrity Initiative, FACEBOOK FOR MEDIA 
(Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/facebookmedia/blog/introducing-the-news-
integrity-initiative [https://perma.cc/L3DN-WAHG]; NEWS LITERACY PROJECT, 
http://www.thenewsliteracyproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/BK4W-7Y4B] (last visited Apr. 
10, 2020).   
47 FACEBOOK, FACEBOOK REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CODE OF PRACTICE FOR 
DISINFORMATION: ANNUAL REPORT SEPTEMBER 2019 5.1–.2 (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=62681 [https://perma.cc/8EUC-
2Z5A] [hereinafter FACEBOOK: CODE OF PRACTICE].  
48 GOOGLE DISINFORMATION REPORT, supra note 37, at 17–19.  
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educational videos targeted at their users, including one on fake news and another 
on “Authenticity Online,” using GIFs, short texts, and memes.49  
 
5.  Transparency 
 
In addition to providing context and encouraging critical thinking, the platforms 
have also been expanding transparency around their efforts to enforce the above-
mentioned platform rules. For instance, Facebook’s most recent Community 
Standards Enforcement Reports (“CSER”), include metrics for its enforcement of 
policies against “fake accounts” and “spam.”50 Facebook has also created a Data 
Transparency Advisory Group, “made up of international experts in measurement, 
statistics, criminology and governance” tasked with providing an independent, 
public assessment of whether the metrics used in the CSER provide accurate and 
meaningful measures of Facebook’s content moderation challenges and efforts to 
address them.51 Google has also begun reporting on the number of removals for 
“spam, misleading content, and scams” on YouTube. According to its most recent 
transparency report, such content accounted for 58.9% of all removals on that 
platform.52  
Facebook, Google, and Twitter have also clarified their political advertising 
policies, creating public repositories of such ads, and increasing reporting on their 
efforts to enforce their policies (although this has been an area of much 
controversy).53 Meanwhile, Mozilla—the company that develops the open-source 
web browser Firefox—has developed a model “effective ad archive” API 
(Application Programing Interface) and challenged the larger platforms to ensure 
that their own ad APIs meet that standard.54 
                                               
49 Julia Alexander, Tumblr Is Rolling Out an Internet Literacy Initiative to Help Combat 
Misinformation and Cyberbullying, THE VERGE (Jan. 6, 2020, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/6/21048134/tumblr-misinformation-2020-election-cyber 
bullying-digital-literacy [https://perma.cc/LAA9-5SBW].  
50 See FACEBOOK, COMMUNITY STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT REPORT (Nov. 2019), 
https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement [https://perma.cc/BS 
3U-RS5L] (last visited March 26, 2020) (providing reporting on fake accounts and spam).  
51 Radha Iyengar Plumb, An Independent Report on How We Measure Content 
Moderation, FACEBOOK (May 23, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/05/dtag-report/ 
[https://perma.cc/C8VW-HRF8]. 
52 YouTube Community Guidelines Enforcement, GOOGLE: TRANSPARENCY REPORT, 
https://transparencyreport.google.com/youtube-policy/removals [https://perma.cc/4W5V-
EBBN] (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).   
53 See, e.g., Elizabeth Culliford, Factbox: How Social Media Sites Handle Political Ads, 
REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2019, 11:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-
advertising-factbox/factbox-how-social-media-sites-handle-political-ads-idUSKBN1XP2 
2G [https://perma.cc/EV75-GPWZ] (discussing the growing pressure on online entities to 
stop carrying false or misleading political ads). 
54 Facebook and Google: This Is What an Effective Ad Archive API Looks Like, 
MOZILLA: BLOG (Mar. 27, 2019), https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2019/03/27/facebook-and-
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B.  Governmental Efforts 
 
A number of governments have developed approaches to disinformation online 
and many more are in the process of doing so. According to one source, at least 52 
countries representing every region of the world have implemented or are actively 
considering some form of legal, regulatory, or policy approach to disinformation, 
misinformation, or fake news.55 While a review of all these efforts is beyond the 
scope of this Essay, this Section provides analysis of four particular efforts that 
illustrate the diversity of approaches under consideration, as well as the potential 
challenges they each may raise. 
 
1.  EU Code of Practice on Disinformation 
 
The European Commission has led the most coherent, coordinated, and 
sustained effort to address disinformation to date, working together with leading 
content platforms and advertising industry representatives. In late 2017, the 
Commission convened a High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online 
Disinformation, which delivered a report in March of 2018 titled, “A Multi-
Dimensional Approach to Disinformation.”56 That report informed the 
Commission’s April 2018 Communication, which included a pledge to develop “an 
ambitious Code of Practice,” building on the principles proposed by the High Level 
Expert Group and committing online platforms and the advertising industry to a 
range of objectives.57  
The Code of Practice was published in September of 2018,58 and a month later 
it was “signed” by Google, Mozilla, and Twitter, as well as by advertisers and 
advertising industry groups, each of which presented “roadmaps” detailing their 
respective plans “to extend their tools against disinformation to all EU Member 
States” (Facebook signed in November 2018 and Microsoft signed in May 2019).59 
It contains five core commitments related to: (1) scrutiny of ad placements; (2) 
political advertising and issue-based advertising; (3) integrity of services; (4) 
empowering consumers; and (5) empowering the research community,60 as well as 
an “annex” listing “best practices” and examples of corresponding, existing 
                                               
google-this-is-what-an-effective-ad-archive-api-looks-like/ [https://perma.cc/8CXU-
ACQN].  
55 Daniel Funke & Daniela Flamini, A Guide to Anti-Misinformation Actions Around 
the World, POYNTER, https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/anti-misinformation-actions/ 
[https://perma.cc/S5BJ-SZGV] (last updated Apr. 9, 2018). 
56 See High Level Group Report, supra note 8.  
57 Tackling Online Disinformation, supra note 6, at § 3.1.1. 
58 See EU CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 6. 
59 Roadmaps to Implement the Code of Practice on Disinformation, EUR. COMM’N, 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/roadmaps-implement-code-practice-dis 
information [https://perma.cc/RBK8-36CE] (last updated Feb. 13, 2020).  
60 EU CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 6, at II.A–E. 
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policies/actions by participating companies.61 Notwithstanding all of this, members 
of the “Sounding Board” of the “Multistakeholder Forum on Disinformation Online” 
issued a statement criticizing the Code for “contain[ing] no common approach, no 
clear and meaningful commitments, no measurable objectives or KPIs, hence no 
possibility to monitor process, and no compliance or enforcement tool. . . .”62 
As part of the Code, participating entities commit to producing annual reports 
detailing these efforts63 and the Commission pledged to produce a report 
summarizing actions taken during the initial year of Code implementation 
(“assessment report”).64 In the interim, the Commission also asked Facebook, 
Google, and Twitter to provide monthly reports between January and May of 2019 
detailing the steps they were taking to address disinformation in the context of the 
2019 European Parliamentary elections.65 After receiving the annual reports, the 
Commission issued a statement expressing mixed reviews and noting that, to date, 
actions to empower consumers and researchers lagged behind those related to 
advertising scrutiny, de-monetization, transparency, and integrity of services.66 The 
Commission’s full assessment report is expected to be produced in early 2020. In 
the Commission’s words, “[s]hould the results under the Code prove unsatisfactory, 
the Commission may propose further measures, including of a regulatory nature.”67 
  
                                               
61 Id. at Annex 2, https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54455 
[https://perma.cc/RXR7-5R39] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020). 
62 THE SOUNDING BRD., THE SOUNDING BOARD’S UNANIMOUS FINAL OPINION ON THE 
SO-CALLED CODE OF PRACTICE (Sept. 24, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/docu 
ment.cfm?doc_id=54456 [https://perma.cc/UL26-N7AE] [hereinafter SOUNDING BOARD 
OPINION]. 
63 Annual Self-Assessment Reports of Signatories to the Code of Practice on 
Disinformation 2019, EUR. COMM’N (last updated Oct. 31, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/digit 
al-single-market/en/news/annual-self-assessment-reports-signatories-code-practice-disinfo 
rmation-2019 [https://perma.cc/NF9H-TRKQ] (aggregating 2019 annual reports) 
[hereinafter Annual Self-Assessment Report 2019]. 
64 European Commission Contribution to the European Council: Action Plan Against 
Disinformation, at 19, COM (2018) 36 final (Dec. 5, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission 
/sites/beta-political/files/eu-communication-disinformation-euco-05122018_en.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/TEX3-6954]. 
65 See Last Intermediate Results of the EU Code of Practice Against Disinformation, 
EUR. COMM’N (June 14, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/last-
intermediate-results-eu-code-practice-against-disinformation [https://perma.cc/PQ7F-
CFYW]. 
66 See Annual Self-Assessment Report 2019, supra note 63. 
67 Code of Practice on Disinformation One Year On: Online Platforms Submit Self-
Assessment Reports, EUR. COMM’N (Oct. 29, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/press 
corner/detail/en/STATEMENT_19_6166 [https://perma.cc/5XQJ-HY4C]. 
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2.  France’s Law on Manipulation of Information 
 
Soon after his 2017 election, which featured allegations of foreign, state-
sponsored hacking and disinformation, President Macron announced his intent to 
introduce a new law to address fake news in the context of elections.68 The law that 
passed that year was eventually amended to focus more precisely on “manipulation 
of information,”69 which it defined as “inaccurate or misleading allegations or 
imputations that falsely report facts, with the aim of changing the sincerity of an 
upcoming election” and provide a mechanism whereby individuals, public 
authorities, and political parties can seek expedited judicial review of certain 
content.70 This mechanism only applies during the three months prior to certain 
voting events and to content that has been spread online “deliberately, artificially or 
automatically, and massively.”71 Where a judge finds that the content meets the 
definition and these criteria, they may take any and all “proportionate and necessary 
measures” to halt its dissemination.72  
The law also sets out a “duty of cooperation” for online platforms, which 
includes the provision of tools for users to flag disinformation, as well as other 
transparency and media literacy commitments.73 Finally, it gives new authorities to 
the Higher Audiovisual Council (“CSA”) to oversee this “duty of cooperation,” as 
                                               
68 Angelique Chrisafis, Emmanuel Macron Promises Ban on Fake News During 
Elections, GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2018, 3:45 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/ 
jan/03/emmanuel-macron-ban-fake-news-french-president [https://perma.cc/L4R2-MLL8]. 
69 This change was reportedly made after the publication of an opinion by the French 
Constitutional Council in order to ensure that satire was not penalized under the law. See La 




70 Proposition de Loi n° 190 du 20 novembre 2018 de relative à la lutte contre la 
manipulation de l’information [Proposal of Law No. 190 of November 20, 2018 relating to 
the fight against the manipulation of information], ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE [NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY], Nov. 20, 2018, Tit. I, Art. 1, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/15/ta/tap0190 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/NWC9-8Q3E] (amending the Electoral Code) [hereinafter Proposition 
de Loi n° 190]. 
71 Id. at Tit. I, Art. 1, Art. L. 163-2.  
72 Id. 
73 See id. at Tit. III, Art. 11. See also Alexander Damiano Ricci, French Opposition 
Parties Are Taking Macron’s Anti-Misinformation Law to Court, POYNTER (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2018/french-opposition-parties-are-taking-macrons-
anti-misinformation-law-to-court/ [https://perma.cc/R5LV-CBJH] (discussing the duty of 
cooperation and how online platforms have to establish a “tool for users to flag 
disinformation” as well as other measures). 
 
934 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
well as to revoke the radio and television broadcast rights of entities that disseminate 
disinformation and are “under the influence of” or “controlled” by a foreign state.74 
 
3.  Singapore’s Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 
(“POFMA”) 
 
In May of 2019, Singapore enacted POFMA, the purpose of which is to: prevent 
communication of false statements; suppress online locations that repeatedly 
communicate false statements; enable measures to detect, control, and safeguard 
against coordinated inauthentic behavior; and enhance disclosure of information 
concerning paid political content.75 
The law states circularly that “a statement is false if it is false or misleading” 
and provides significant criminal sanctions for anyone communicating such a 
statement in Singapore knowing or having reason to believe that it is false and “is 
likely to be” prejudicial in a variety of possible ways.76 It also criminalizes 
knowingly providing services to be used in communicating offending content.77 
Uniquely, the law allows “any Minister” to order either a “correction direction” or a 
“stop communication direction” to the author, as well as to an internet intermediary, 
for any false statement of fact if they are “of the opinion that it is in the public 
interest.”78  
Notably, a targeted correction order can require an intermediary to 
communicate that correction “to all end-users in Singapore that it knows had 
accessed” the statement, implying that they must enable ways to track user activity 
retroactively.79 Failure to comply with any such direction can result in criminal 
liability, as well as a blocking order.80 All aspects of the law expressly apply 
extraterritorially.81  
  
                                               
74 Proposition de Loi n° 190, supra note 70, at Tit. II, Art. 10 (unofficial Google 
translation). 
75 See Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 (No. 18 of 2019), 
June 3, 2019, pt. 1, § 5 (Sing.), https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Acts-Supp/182019/Published/201906 
25?DocDate=20190625 [https://perma.cc/KA2R-XPMT] [hereinafter, POFMA]. 
76 Id. at pt. 1, § 2(2), pt. 2, § 7(1)(b). 
77 See id. at pt. 2, § 9(1).  
78 Id. at pt. 3, § 10, & pt. 4, § 20.  
79 Id. at pt. 4, § 21(2)(b).  
80 Id. at pt. 4 §§ 27–28. 
81 Id. at pt. 9 § 60. 
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4.  Malaysia’s Anti-Fake News Act 
 
In April 2018, Malaysia enacted an “Anti-Fake News” law just ahead of 
national elections that resulted in a change in government.82 The law prohibits the 
malicious creation, offering, publication, printing, distribution, circulation or 
dissemination of “fake news,” which it defined as “any news, information, data and 
reports, which is or are wholly or partly false . . . .”83 It defines these acts broadly 
such that they could include “re-tweets,” forwards, and other actions that may not 
constitute endorsement.84 Violators could face significant fines and up to six years 
in prison.85 
The law also appears to create liability for intermediaries, including page 
administrators and moderators, that fail to immediately remove content “after 
knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe” that it contains fake news.86 
Finally, the law appears to allow for extraterritorial application where fake news 
“concerns Malaysia or the person affected by the commission of the offence is a 
Malaysian citizen.”87 The new, current government has attempted, so far 
unsuccessfully, to repeal the law.88 
 
V.  TAKING STOCK AND MOVING FORWARD 
 
A.  Corporate Approaches to Date 
 
The corporate initiatives summarized above vary slightly at the margins but at 
their core are all primarily reactive, supply-side approaches. Given the “definitional” 
and “intent” challenges explained above, they have all wisely resisted censorship-
oriented reactions, focusing instead on identifying and contextualizing potential 
disinformation. While this may help some users reconsider information they might 
otherwise believe, there is also evidence that for many users these approaches are at 
                                               
82 See Trinna Leong & Nadirah H. Rodzi, Malaysia Passes Anti-Fake News Bill, 
STRAITS TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018, 05:52 PM), https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-
asia/malaysia-votes-in-anti-fake-news-law [https://perma.cc/KK75-AU75].  
83 ARTICLE 19, MALAYSIA: “ANTI-FAKE NEWS ACT” 9 (Apr. 2018), 
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/2018.04.22-Malaysia-Fake-News-
Legal-Analysis-FINAL-v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/F578-J2WQ] [hereinafter ARTICLE 19 
LEGAL ANALYSIS] (quoting Section 2 of Malaysia Anti-Fake News Act). 
84 See id. 
85 Id. at 11–12. 
86 Id. at 12–13. 
87 Id. at 16 (citing Section 3 of the Act). 
88 See THE LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., INITIATIVES TO COUNTER FAKE NEWS IN SELECTED 
COUNTRIES 68–69 (Apr. 2019), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/fake-news/counter-fake-
news.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPS6-KJ9W]. 
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best ineffective and at worst can reinforce the very content they are meant to 
discount.89  
Sophisticated efforts to demonetize and de-platform repeat abusers have made 
the business of disinformation more difficult and should be enhanced. However, 
these efforts may be hampered by the platforms’ lack of appetite to go after news 
sources that peddle disinformation but are seen as providing “ideological 
diversity.”90 In addition, given the “harm” challenge discussed above, the most 
persistent abusers are often able to easily regroup, tweak their tactics, and re-
engage.91 Unless and until there are significant improvements in attribution, these 
approaches are likely to continue to have limited impact.  
More promising are the sophisticated approaches to detecting and neutralizing 
large-scale, coordinated disinformation campaigns (i.e., coordinated inauthentic 
behavior).92 However, platforms still face serious challenges disaggregating harmful 
disinformation from legitimate speech, including satire and irony, across thousands 
of languages and dialects. Given this, and the tendency for disinformation 
campaigns to overlap with and reinforce existing authentic content, it is likely that 
these top-down, data-driven approaches will unintentionally lead to some degree of 
“over removal” and/or be manipulated by authorities to target legitimate speech, 
causing potentially serious freedom of expression consequences.93  
As the European Commission has noted, efforts to empower consumers and 
researchers, including by providing detailed data about disinformation campaigns, 
have received far less priority to date.94 When it comes to digital literacy, companies 
whose businesses hinge on understanding the tendencies and preferences of their 
users are well placed to produce effective, attractive campaigns, as well as to 
measure their effectiveness. However, to the extent certain prophylactic tactics may 
                                               
89 See Samuel Woolley & Katie Joseff, Demand for Deceit: How the Way We Think 
Drives Disinformation 11, 23 (Jan. 2020) (working paper) (on file with the National 
Endowment for Democracy), https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Demand-
for-Deceit.pdf [https://perma.cc/B558-9UY6]. 
90 See Omer Benjakob, Why Wikipedia Is Much More Effective than Facebook at 
Fighting Fake News, HAARETZ (Jan. 9, 2020, 11:43 PM), https://www.haaretz.com/us-
news/.premium-why-wikipedia-is-much-more-effective-than-facebook-at-fighting-fake-
news-1.8378622 [https://perma.cc/4A98-BCGY] (discussing Wikipedia’s decision to 
designate a number of pro-Trump news outlets as unreliable). 
91 See, e.g., Warzel, supra note 32.   
92 See supra Section IV.A.3. 
93 See, e.g., Layli Foroudi, In Algeria, ‘Electronic Flies’ Threaten a Protest Movement, 
.CODA (Dec. 10, 2019), https://codastory.com/disinformation/algeria-election-protest/ 
[https://perma.cc/2BPX-G39D] (describing how Facebook removed a “pro-democracy 
activist” who posted news and poetry). 
94 See FACEBOOK: CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 47, at 51. 
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contradict those companies’ financial interests, critics can be forgiven for being 
skeptical that they are the best messenger.95  
Enhancing the ability of credible, objective third parties, such as independent 
academics, to examine the tactics and impact of disinformation campaigns, user 
behavior, and efforts to address the former by modifying the latter is vital. Although 
there have been some efforts in this direction, much more is needed. To the extent 
that companies cite data protection and other laws as barriers to such practices, they 
must be clearer and more explicit as to what precisely is impeding progress.96 At the 
same time, policy makers should act quickly to clarify or rectify any such 
restrictions.    
 
B.  Government Approaches to Date 
 
Government efforts to address disinformation have demonstrated a diversity of 
strategies. The EU’s approach deserves praise for its open and consultative nature, 
as well as its inclination to resist resorting immediately to regulation (for now). This 
effort has had clear and tangible impacts on company behavior97 and has yielded 
valuable transparency about the quality and quantity of disinformation campaigns 
on the major content platforms, as well as the efforts by the platforms to address 
them.98 However, the Code has also been criticized on the one hand for allowing too 
                                               
95 See Rachel Kaser, Facebook’s Digital Literacy Library Is an Imperfect Course in 
Online Etiquette, NEXT WEB (Aug. 2, 2018), https://thenextweb.com/facebook/2018/08/02/ 
facebooks-digital-literacy-library-is-an-imperfect-course-in-online-etiquette/ [https://perma. 
cc/W3QP-Q8ZK]. 
96 Early this year, the European Data Protection Supervisor issued an “Advisory 
Opinion,” noting that “[t]here are concerns that the references to fundamental rights in the 
Code of Conduct on Disinformation could be a cover for . . . attempts to avoid scrutiny. . . . 
Resistance to greater transparency and accountability is justified [by social media 
companies] on questionable grounds of data protection,” and it appears that “the reluctance 
to give access to genuine researchers is motivated no[t] so much by data protection concerns 
as by the absence of business incentive to invest effort in disclosing or being transparent 
about the volume and nature of data they control.” EUROPEAN DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR, A 
PRELIMINARY OPINION ON DATA PROTECTION AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 9 (Jan. 6, 2020), 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/20-01-06_opinion_research_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AX4E-EFLD].  
97 See Peter H. Chase, The EU Code of Practice on Disinformation: The Difficulty of 
Regulating a Nebulous Problem 14 (Aug. 29, 2019) (working paper) (on file with the 
Transatlantic Working Group on Content Moderation Online and Freedom of Expression), 
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/EU_Code_Practice_Disinformation_Aug_2019.p
df [https://perma.cc/38KC-5WAG] (noting that the Code of Practice and associated efforts 
by the European Commission “are clearly making a difference in the behavior of the largest 
platforms on advertising, system integrity, public education and research access”).  
98 See generally GOOGLE DISINFORMATION REPORT, supra note 37 (discussing 
Google’s practices on disinformation). 
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much flexibility on the part of the platforms99 and on the other for delegating too 
much authority and generally relying too much on platforms.100  
The French government took a comparatively narrow approach by creating a 
time-limited (within three-months of elections) mechanism that keeps the 
adjudicatory function within the judicial branch, rather than outsourcing it to 
executive branch officials (as under POFMA), or relying on users to identify and 
platforms to adjudicate under the shadow of potential liability (like the notice-and-
take-down approach in Malaysian law). However, this does not mean the law has 
been without controversy,101 and it is too soon to know how the newly instituted 
“duty of cooperation” will work and impact freedom of expression. 
Given the change in government and the lingering (although increasingly stale) 
promise to significantly revise if not repeal Malaysia’s Anti-Fake News Act, it is not 
surprising that there is not much clarity as to its implementation. However, the 
breadth of the definitions, the vagueness of key aspects, the creation of an 
intermediary liability regime, and the harshness of the penalties in the law have all 
generated serious criticism.102 
Singapore’s POFMA has only been in force for a few months, but its early 
application has already generated considerable controversy.103 To date, it appears 
that five of the six initial applications of the law have been against political figures 
or parties, which has confirmed the fears of many, notwithstanding the government’s 
                                               
99 See, e.g., SOUNDING BOARD OPINION, supra note 62. 
100 See ALEX KRASODOMSKI-JONES ET AL., DEMOS, WARRING SONGS: INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 10–11 (2019), https://demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/ 
2019/05/Warring-Songs-final-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/38KC-5WAG]; Aleksandra 
Kuczerawy, Fighting Online Disinformation: Did the EU Code of Practice Forget About 
Freedom of Expression?, 6 DISINFORMATION AND DIGITAL MEDIA AS A CHALLENGE FOR 
DEMOCRACY: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRACY SER. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 9–13), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3453732 [https://perma.cc/955X-7KB6]. 
101 See, e.g., David Kaye, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Letter dated May 28, 2018 from the Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression addressed to the Government of France, U.N. Doc. OL FRA 5/2018 (May 28, 
2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL-FRA-5-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/53B6-2W4D] (discussing France’s law governing disinformation). 
102 See ARTICLE 19 LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra note 83, at 7–8; David Kaye, U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, Letter dated April 3, 2018 from the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression addressed to the Government 
of Malaysia, U.N. Doc. OL MYS 1/2018 (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL_MYS_03.04.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/53B6-2W4D].  
103 See Kristen Han, Want to Criticize Singapore? Expect a ‘Correction Notice,’ N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/21/opinion/fake-news-law-
singapore.html [https://perma.cc/U5FG-K5MW]. 
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contention that this is simply a “coincidence.”104 The sixth and most recent 
application is against several news sources, as well as a Malaysian-based nonprofit 
that has refused to comply, potentially setting up a first blocking order under the 
law.105 While it is always difficult to measure “chilling effects,” given the generally 
weak protections for freedom of expression and media in Singapore,106 it seems quite 
likely that the law and its early application are having significant impacts on freedom 
of expression. 
Taken together, the limited set of government initiatives surveyed here suggests 
several observations. First, it is very difficult to appropriately address disinformation 
without risking serious negative implications for freedom of expression. As the five 
special mandate holders on freedom of expression and/or the media have noted, “the 
human right to impart information and ideas is not limited to ‘correct’ statements . . . 
[and] protects information and ideas that may shock, offend and disturb.”107 While 
these controversial ideas can be important in their own right, an even greater concern 
in democratic systems is the need to preserve the space to develop, express, and 
debate different ideas, which requires a degree of “intellectual privacy” that heavy-
handed approaches to disinformation can inhibit.108 This is especially true in 
countries that are not considered consolidated democracies. While narrower 
approaches, such as the one taken by France, may mitigate some of these potential 
consequences, they may also limit their intended impacts as well.  
Second, efforts to work collaboratively with platforms through voluntary 
frameworks such as the “Code of Practice” can have impact but are limited both in 
scope (i.e., only those companies that “voluntarily” participate) and effect 
(companies will only go as far as they choose to go). In addition, it is unlikely that 
smaller political entities and/or markets will have the clout, expertise, and stamina 
to successfully engage in similar efforts.  
Finally, although all of these initiatives have their respective faults (and some 
of them have many), they each share an important characteristic insofar as they 
address disinformation on its own, without grouping it together with other types of 
prohibited or problematic content. Given the unique characteristics that set 
disinformation apart from other categories of online content (the “definition,” 
“intent,” and “harm” challenges, discussed above in Section III), this approach 
                                               
104 John Geddie, Coincidence that Fake News Law Applied to Politicians, Singapore 
Minister Says, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2020), https://news.yahoo.com/coincidence-fake-news-law-
applied-082913894.html [https://perma.cc/8P3G-G9KL].  
105 See John Geddie, Singapore Rebuts Illegal Hanging Report, Serves Fake News 
Notices, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2020, 10:48 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-singapore-
execution/singapore-rebuts-illegal-hanging-report-serves-fake-news-notices-idUSKBN1ZL 
0I3 [https://perma.cc/Y2SJ-BLLB]. 
106 See Freedom in the World 2019: Singapore, FREEDOM HOUSE (2019), 
https://freedomhouse.org/country/singapore/freedom-world/2019 [https://perma.cc/7YR3-
64N9] (last visited Apr. 13, 2020) (rating Singapore as “Partly Free”). 
107 Joint Declaration, supra note 4, at 1. 
108 See generally Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008) 
(arguing for legal protection of records of intellectual activities under the First Amendment). 
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makes sense. While it is understandably tempting to develop one regulatory regime 
to rule all forms of online content, policy makers and legislators would be wise to 
consider disinformation on its own merits and learn from the experiences of those 
who have attempted to address it to date. 
